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The ability to attribute different mental states to distinct individuals, or Theory of Mind
(ToM), is widely believed to be developed mostly during preschool years. How different
factors such as gender, number of siblings, or coarse personality traits affect this
development is not entirely agreed upon. Here, we introduce a computerized version of
the scaled ToM suite of tasks introduced by Wellman and Liu (2004), which allows us to
meaningfully test ToM development on children 6 to 8-years old. We find that kids this
age are still not entirely proficient in all ToM tasks, and continue to show a progression
of performance with age. By testing this new age range, too, we are able to observe a
significant advantage of girls over boys in ToM performance. Other factors such as number
of siblings, birth order, and coarse personality traits show no significant relation with the
ToM task results. Finally, we introduce a novel way to quantify the scaling property of
the suite involving a sequence of set inclusions on one hand and a comparison between
specially tailored sets of logistic models on the other. These measures confirm the validity
of the scale in the 6- to 8-years old range.
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INTRODUCTION
Theory of Mind (ToM) is an important cognitive skill that
refers broadly to our capacity to understand others’ mental states
including beliefs, desires, and knowledge, and the ability to com-
prehend that these may differ from our own (Premack and
Woodruff, 1978). A paradigmatic example of a task requiring a
well-developed ToM is that of false belief, which involves under-
standing that an agent might have a wrong representation of
external reality, and act according to that representation (Baron-
Cohen et al., 1985). ToM is deeply integrated with other cognitive
domains and abilities. Among other factors, ToM development
has been related to the success on executive function tests, and
various assessments of language and social experience (Dunn
et al., 1991; Dunn, 1995; Astington and Jenkins, 1999; Carlson
and Moses, 2001; Apperly, 2012).
Over the past two decades, developmental changes in chil-
dren’s understanding of others’ minds have been the focus of
intense research (Wellman and Woolley, 1990; Dunn et al., 1991;
Gopnik and Slaughter, 1991; Flavell, 1999; Astington and Jenkins,
1999; Meltzoff, 1999; Wellman et al., 2001). Most of the work
performed to date was done in preschool children (3 to 5-years
old) and coarsely agrees in that the basic aspects of ToM are
mostly developed within this age range [Bartsch and Wellman,
1995; see Flavell (1999), for a review]. However, some studies
argue that ToM continues to develop and change throughout life
(Bosacki and Astington, 1999; Apperly, 2012; Devine andHughes,
2012; Moran, 2013). Rai and Mitchell’s (2004) study has shown
that there is still considerable instability in understanding false
beliefs in 5-years old, especially when the false belief scenario
is framed in relation to a person’s conscious choice or decision,
rather than a physical object. Furthermore, Dumontheil et al.’
(2010) results suggest that ToM improves between late adoles-
cence and adulthood and even if ToM tasks are passed by age
4; their data indicate that the interaction between understand-
ing others’ mind and executive functions continues to develop in
late adolescence (Dumontheil et al., 2010). Bosacki and Astington
(1999) used ambiguous social vignettes followed by questions to
assess the understanding of particular aspects of other’s mental
states in a study with preadolescent children. Their study was
conceived from a ToM perspective in order to quantify preadoles-
cents’ mentalizing abilities and their results partially support that,
individual differences in preadolescents’ ability to understand the
thoughts and emotions of others would be related to their social
competence (Bosacki and Astington, 1999).
Most studies on ToM have not addressed issues of gender,
family environment, and measures of temperament. A slight
advantage of preschool girls on emotion understanding and false
belief task performance has been observed before (Banerjee, 1997;
Charman and Clements, 2002; Walker, 2005), nevertheless, most
previous studies have found no significant gender differences
on ToM development (Hughes and Dunn, 1998; Charman and
Clements, 2002; Walker, 2005; Mathieson and Banerjee, 2011;
Devine and Hughes, 2012). On the other hand, in studies carried
out in preadolescence, girls performed significantly higher on the
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social understanding task (ToM) than boys independent of vocab-
ulary ability (Bosacki and Astington, 1999). These results support
Hatcher et al.’ (1990) findings, in which girls scored higher than
boys on social understanding tasks across grades 4 through 12.
Further, the recent study in adolescents by Ibanez et al. (2013)
presents a model that shows the direct effect of empathy, sex,
and fluid intelligence on ToM. Only recent studies have found
some relations between scores on false belief tasks and preschool
children’s family environments (Perner et al., 1994; Farhadian
et al., 2010). However, there is no consensus on whether the
amount of siblings or the birth order influences the develop-
ment of ToM (Azmitia and Hesser, 1993; Lewis et al., 1996;
Ruffman et al., 1998; Cutting and Dunn, 1999; Farhadian et al.,
2010).
A complementary aim of most developmental studies of ToM
consists in understanding the sequential unfolding of abilities
underlying a full ToM. To date there is consensus in the notion
that a child will correctly judge a person’s desires before she can
correctly judge her beliefs, and that she will be able to grasp that
an agent might have a belief different from her own first if she
doesn’t know the true state of affairs, and only later if she does
know what reality really is like (false belief). Cutting and Dunn
(1999), Wellman and Liu (2004), Wellman et al. (2001) and, more
recently, Wellman et al. (2011) have investigated this progression
of abilities. In particular, Wellman and Liu (2004) proposed a
suite of ToM tasks, based upon a meta-analysis of the literature
of ToM developmental studies, and tested it in children from 3 to
5-years of age. Their results suggest that the abilities underlying
ToM are attained progressively, and can thus be tested individ-
ually by an ordered suite such that a child capable of correctly
performing a certain task in the suite should also be able to cor-
rectly perform all preceding tasks. Wellman and Liu’s scaled suite
of tasks has been subsequently employed to pinpoint cultural dif-
ferences in the development of ToM (Wellman et al., 2006, 2011;
Shahaeian et al., 2011).
In this work, we implement and test a computer version of
Wellman and Liu’s (2004) ToM suite in children in the 6 to 8-years
old range. The aim of this work is threefold: first, we test whether
it is possible to use the suite to test ToMdevelopment in older kids
and check if the scaling seen in preschoolers is still valid in our
version of the test. The age range chosen in this work is sometimes
overlooked in the literature, even if it has been shown that chil-
dren do not understandmetaphor or irony before the age of six to
seven (Ackerman, 1981)—-two behaviors that entail the capacity
to go beyond the literal meaning of a statement—- and that they
cannot reliably distinguish jokes from lies before age 6 to 7-years
(Sullivan et al., 1995). In accordance, our first hypothesis is that
ToM progression of Wellman and Liu’s suite will still be present
in children 6 to 8-years old.
Second, given that gender differences might be expected in
ToM, and in line with the gender intensification hypothesis
(Hill and Lynch, 1983), which establishes that gender differences
increase in time because of growing pressure to conform to tradi-
tional gender-role stereotypes, we hypothesized that in a slightly
older group of children—-in relation to the usually age range
explore in the literature (3 to 5-years old)—- gender may have
an appreciable effect on ToM performance.
The third and final aim of this work is to develop a novel anal-
ysis to quantify the validity of the scaling in the suite. The method
we use has two parts: one uses set inclusions to quantify the extent
to which the data differ from a perfect scaling, while the other
involves the comparison between specially tailored sets of logistic
models. The difference in prediction power among these sets of
models gives another measure of the scaling quality.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Seventy-six first (36) and second (40) graders [mean age: 7-years
and 3 months (86.5 months); range from 6-years and 1 month to
8-years and 7 months] participated in the study. There were 42
boys and 34 girls in the sample, all of a high socioeconomic status
and attending a well reputed private bilingual school in Buenos
Aires. The school in which the study was performed approved
the research and all children’s parents or legal guardians gave
signed voluntary consent. The consent form, presented to the
caregivers supplemented with a note which explained the pro-
cedure, was previously authorized by the Centro de Educación
Médica e Investigaciones Clínicas “Norberto Quirno” (CEMIC)’s
Ethical Committee.
ToM SUITE
Wellman and Liu’s ToM suite of tasks is thoroughly described
in the appendix of the original paper (Wellman and Liu, 2004).
Briefly, the tasks involved in our version are: (1, DD) Diverse
Desires: the child judges that two persons (her vs. someone else)
have different desires about the same objects; (2, DB) Diverse
Beliefs: the child judges that two persons (her vs. someone else)
have different beliefs about the same object, while she does not
know which belief is the right one; (3, KA) Knowledge Access: the
child sees what is in a box and judges the knowledge of another
person who does not see what is in it; (4, FB) Contents False
Belief: the child judges another person’s false belief about what
is in a distinctive container while she (the child) knows what
actually is inside the container; (5, EFB) Explicit False Belief: the
child judges how someone will search, given that person’s mis-
taken belief, and (6, BE) Belief vs. Emotion: the child judges
how a person will feel given a belief that is mistaken. All tasks
involve a control question which is used to make sure that the
child understood the task, and a target question, which evaluates
their performance. Although all six tasks were used for studying
the influence of diverse factors in ToM development, we note that
only the first four (DD, DB, KA, and FB) are involved in the pro-
gressive suite, and thus all scaling tests were performed only on
these. Finally, we note that Wellman and Liu’s original version of
the suite included also a hidden emotion task. As this task involves
two target questions instead of one target and one control, we
chose to leave it out in order to facilitate direct comparison (the
random choice performance baseline for this task is 33% instead
of the rest of the tasks’ two choice 50%). The implementation of
the suite is depicted in Figure 1.
InWellman and Liu’s version of the suite, some tasks were pre-
sented using toy figurines while others involved drawings. This
makes it difficult both to preserve the parallels among the differ-
ent tasks and to compare the results with those involving other
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FIGURE 1 | Description of the test. The test was delivered to each child in
a novel computer format. The experimenter first said to each child: “There
are six levels; you will have to answer correctly in each one of them to win
the game. Let’s go!” Then, for each task, the experimenter explained the
task to the child, who could choose any of the options given. There were no
wrong answers, such that, independently of the answer, a “CORRECT”
screen appeared next. Three of the tasks are shown in the figure.
methods found in the literature. Further, following our aim of
carrying the scaled ToM suite to an older age range, we formu-
lated it as an engaging computer game, which not only unifies
the presentation format across all tasks, but also reduces the
experimenter’s involvement.
PROCEDURE
Children were tested in a quiet room in the school by one of two
adult experimenters. The six tasks were presented in the increas-
ing difficulty order proposed by Wellman and Liu (2004). All
the children that participated in the study correctly answered the
control question in each task.
Teachers completed the short form of the Child Behavioral
Questionnaire (CBQ) for all their students. This allowed us to
measure child’s temperament along three broad dimensions: (1)
Extraversion/Surgency, (2) Negative Affectivity, and (3) Effortful
Control (Rothbart et al., 2001; Putnam and Rothbart, 2006). They
also filled a second form that included the family background data
(birth order and number of siblings), age, and gender of each
child.
DATA ANALYSIS
In order to summarize the children’s performance in the ToM
suite we compute for each child her z-score, defined as the
amount of correct target answers. Alternative measures were also
tested, in which the contribution of each task to the total score was
weighed either progressively with the task number or with a fac-
tor equal to one minus the observed mean performance for that
task, and then all contributions summed together in a final score.
The results obtained are insensitive to the scoring scheme chosen;
we hence stick to the z-score above.
Throughout the analysis, we used non-parametric permuta-
tion tests in order to assess the significance of results. In each
case, we randomly shuffled the assignments between predictor
and dependent variables, to produce a surrogate version of the
data. The relevant quantity (for instance correlation) was then
evaluated for this surrogate data. By iterating this proceduremany
times (typically a thousand), we obtained the significance level of
the result.
Apart from studying the correlations in the data, we built a
logistic model to assess kids’ responses for all tasks. With this
model, we can study the effect of the different factors in the whole
set of responses, without limiting the analysis to a particular def-
inition of score. Nevertheless, a certain amount of independence
among the factors entering the model is required in order to cor-
rectly interpret the results, and hence we restrict the model to age,
gender, and number of siblings and birth order (considering these
last two as a single factor in order to account for their interdepen-
dence). CBQ scores, on the other hand, were left out, since they
correlate mildly with gender (ex. 0.4 linear correlation between
surgency and gender).
Apart from gender, age, number of siblings, and birth order
as predictors, the model includes dummy variables for discern-
ing among the six tasks in the suite. Since each kid responds to
all six tasks, we also need to index the subjects. As it turns out,
age, sex, sibling amount, and sibling order taken together are
almost enough to identify all subjects. There are however, five
cases in which these repeat, so we resolve them by adding an extra
indicator variable (i.e., order in which they took the experiment).
To measure the importance of each factor in predicting the
results, we compare the full model with that with the factor in
question removed. The difference between the log likelihoods of
both models follows a χ2 distribution [apart from a factor of 2,
see Stevenson (2004)], and we can hence evaluate the correspond-
ing p-value. The p-values thus obtained are in agreement with
those computed with the full model under the assumption of
normally distributed errors.
RESULTS
ToM PERFORMANCE IN 6 TO 8-YEARS OLD CHILDREN
Despite the fact that some studies indicate that the development
of a full ToM continues all throughout life (Devine and Hughes,
2012;Moran, 2013), almost all research has focused in 3 to 5-years
old children. We took a step further to contribute to elucidate
these notions and we examined age, gender, and family back-
ground influence on ToM development in the age range of 6 to
8 years old. Figure 2 shows the average performance for the four
tasks involved in the scaling for all children (thick black bars).
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FIGURE 2 | Kids’ average performance. Fraction correct, mean, thick black
bars; boys, left thin blue bars; girls, right thin red bars.
The average performance for our first and second graders is in
the same range as that of the preschoolers studied by Wellman
and Liu, suggesting that the smaller intervention of the experi-
menter enabled by the computer platform allows for the testing
of older kids without saturating the suite. Average performance
for tasks EFB and BE was 0.64 and 0.6, respectively, also similar
to that of Wellman and Liu’s preschoolers. These tasks were not
included in the graph to emphasize the progression effect in the
first four.
In accordance with our first hypothesis that ToM progression
of Wellman and Liu’s suite will still be present in 6 to 8-years
old, we observed an increase in ToM proficiency with age, with z-
scores significantly correlated with age (r = 0.334, p = 0.003 per-
mutation test), This result stresses even further the fact that the
test is effective in the new age range, and shows that the general
performance drop is not merely due to a statistical fluctuation.
Average performance divided by gender is also shown in
Figure 2 (boys in left blue thin bars and girls in right red thin
bars). For task EFB we have average performances of 0.7 for girls
and 0.6 for boys, while for the BE task we obtain 0.76 for girls and
0.48 for boys. We observe a clear effect of gender in ToM perfor-
mance, with girls performing significantly better than boys in all
tasks (p = 0.037 permutation test, grouped tasks). This gender
effect is task-independent, as we show using the logistic model
described in the following section.
We also studied the effect of family background and child tem-
perament, factors whose potential influence in ToM performance
has been previously discussed in the literature (Dunn et al., 1991;
Perner et al., 1994; Dunn, 1995; Farhadian et al., 2010). Contrary
to age and gender findings and in agreement with previous data
(Lewis et al., 1996; Cutting and Dunn, 1999) we find no effect
of sibling amount (r = 0.034, p = 0.766, permutation test) or
birth order (r = −0.043, p = 0.729, permutation test) in ToM
performance.
Similarly, coarse personality traits as evaluated by the CBQ
do not correlate significantly with the z-score (Surgency:
r = −0.169, p = 0.149; Negative Affect: r = 0.197, p = 0.093;
Effortful Control: r = 0.118, p = 0.315; permutation tests).
The logistic model analysis fully supports the results discussed
above. By taking one factor at a time out of the model, we can see
how relevant each factor is in explaining the kids’ responses (see
Materials and Methods). The computed p-values are: age, p =
0.002; sex, p = 0.015; siblings (amount and order), p = 0.978. By
testing an expanded model including a joint sex-task factor, we
see that these two variables do not interact (p = 0.47). Hence,
in accordance with our second hypothesis we observed a gen-
der effect in ToM which was not observed for the same task in
preschoolers. The other demographic or individual variables had
no effect in performance.
ToM SUITE PROGRESSION
We now turn to quantify the extent to which the ToM suite
embodies a progressive test, that is, one in which in order to cor-
rectly resolve a given step, one must have the abilities required to
solve all previous steps. As we mentioned before, we only consider
tasks 1–4 (DD, DB, KA, and FB) for this part of the analysis, since
it is only these that are involved in the hierarchy.
The progression in difficulty of ToM performance is evident
from Figure 2, which shows a diminishing performance with
increasing task number. An average decrease in performance,
however, does not necessarily imply a sequential process. It is still
possible that a group of children is capable of successfully per-
forming Task 1 (G1) and a smaller group is capable of successfully
performing Task 2 (G2) but that these groups have no intrin-
sic relation other than their difference in size, i.e., |G2| < |G1|,
where | · | denotes set cardinality. The condition of strict sequen-
tial dependence in performance implies that all kids inG2 are also
in G1(G2 ⊂ G1), in other words, that children succeeding in Task
2 also succeed in Task 1. This logic extends for all tasks from 1 to
4, such that Gj ⊂ Gi for all i < j in 1 to 4.
Figure 3 depicts this sequence of inclusions for two extreme
cases, (A) one in which there is no progression at all, and (B)
one in which the hierarchy is perfect, along with our actual result
(C). In this figure, each task is represented by a square whose area
encodes number of kids who successfully passed the task and area
overlap indicates kids passing both corresponding tasks. For clar-
ity, we only represent overlaps of successive tasks. Out of 76 kids,
62 passed DD, 56 passed DB, 48 passed KA, and 36 passed FB. Of
these, 6 passed DB but not DD (11% of those that passed DB),
11 passed KA but not DB (23% of those that passed KA), and 10
passed FB but not KA (28% of those that passed KA). In a perfect
hierarchy, there would be no such cases. These cases, however,
constitute an expected fluctuation. In order to test this statisti-
cally, we take as a figure of merit the sum of cases in which a kid
passed a task without passing the previous one, which is 27 in our
case (lower values of this number represent better scalings). We
then perform a bootstrap procedure in which we shuffle both kids
and tasks, and obtain a surrogate value for this figure of merit. We
find a better (lower) value in less than 1% of the cases, with an
actual p-value of 0.059.
We refine this analysis by examining three sets of logistic mod-
els for the kids’ responses, taken one task of the ToM suite at a
time. The first is a set of Pointwise models, one for each task,
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FIGURE 3 | Task progression as set inclusions. Tasks DD, DB, KA, and FB
are represented as squares in decreasing gray level. Square area
represents amount of kids successfully completing each task, and area
overlap among successive tasks quantifies the amount of kids that
responded correctly for both tasks. (A) Illustrative lack of scaling. (B)
Illustrative perfect scaling. (C) Actual experimental results.
which include as predictors age, gender and sibling amount and
order. The second is a set of Markov models, again one for each
task, which comprise besides the factors in the Pointwise mod-
els the response for the previous task in the scale. For the first
task, these two models are identical. Finally, the third set is one
of Cumulative models, also one for each task, incorporating the
same predictors as the Pointwise models plus the whole history
of previous responses for each kid up to the current task. We
point out that for the second task of the scale the Markov and
Cumulative models coincide.
We compare pairwise the model sets described before, getting
a p-value for the extra variables in a model to be explanatory. The
summarized results are presented in Table 1. We find that, com-
paring the Pointwise andMarkov models, the response to the first
task is a good predictor of the response to the second. This is con-
sistent with the scaling property: a child that did not pass the first
task is very likely to also not pass the second, hence making the
Markov model more powerful than the Pointwise. We note how-
ever, that even in a perfect scaling, we would have some amount of
unpredictability, since we do not know at which point the kids will
start failing the tasks, so that even having the previous task infor-
mation will not help in predicting the outcome of the next. This
Table 1 | Model sets comparison.
Task p Markov vs. Cumulative p Pointwise vs. Markov
2 (DB) – 0.006
3 (KA) 0.768 0.839
4 (FB) 0.724 0.322
is indeed what we see when comparing the Markov and Pointwise
models for the subsequent tasks, where more kids begin to fail.
We can address this issue by further comparing the Markov
and the Cumulative model sets (different only for task 3 and up).
This comparison shows that the extent to which one can predict
the outcome in a certain task by knowing the result for the previ-
ous task is not improved by knowing further previous results, as
should be the case in a perfect hierarchy. In other words, knowing
the result for the first task does not add information to know-
ing the result for the second task, if we are to predict the response
to the third one, and similarly for task 4. This further stresses the
scaling property of the suite.
DISCUSSION
While many studies argue that by the age of four most normally
developing children have already acquired an understanding of
the mind; others instead have shown that ToM continues to
mature at older ages Bosacki and Astington, 1999; Dumontheil
et al., 2010; Devine and Hughes, 2012; Moran, 2013. In the
present study we implement the ToM suite of tasks by means
of a game in a computer platform, thus diminishing the exper-
imenter’s involvement. Corroborating Wellman and Liu (2004)
previous results with preschool kids, we also found that the pro-
gressive and sequential effect of the suite could remain a major
factor in older kids, revealing a hierarchy of nested processes of
ToM in the 6 to 8-years range. However, because this ToM suite of
tasks was never tested with the original age range and procedures
in Argentina more studies need to be done.
We successfully apply the suite in older kids and to reach this
conclusion we introduced a novel method to quantify the scaling
property of the suite. This new proposal involves on one hand an
intuitive quantification through set inclusions, and, on the other,
a thorough comparison of a variety of logistic models including a
varying amount of previous results as predictors for the outcome
of a certain task. Both methods provide strong support for the
scaling, and validate its use in the new age range tested.
Most studies on ToM have not addressed issues of gender. By
testing older kids, we could examine the hypothesis that gen-
der differences in ToM proficiency may develop late. This would
be in accordance to the gender intensification hypothesis (Hill
and Lynch, 1983), which predicts that gender differences increase
in time because of increased pressure to conform to traditional
gender-role stereotypes. Here, we conclusively showed a strong
effect indicating that girls perform significantly better than boys
for all ToM tasks in the age range tested.
Although some studies have proposed facilitative effects of
(older) siblings that may operate via shared experiences of pre-
tend play and deception, and talk about feelings and inter-
nal mental states (Perner et al., 1994; Ruffman et al., 1998;
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Peterson and McAlister, 2006), other work has found no relation
between ToM performance an number of siblings or birth order
(Cutting and Dunn, 1999; Cole and Mitchell, 2000; Hughes and
Ensor, 2005). In our study, the family background included in the
analysis did not correlate with ToM performance, contributing
to the idea that birth order and number of siblings would not be
related to the development of ToM. However, we need to take into
consideration that our results come from children in a new age
range (6 to 8-years old), while previous evidence related to this
particular topic was concentrated on preschoolers.
Similarly, there is some evidence supporting a relation between
understanding of false belief and emotion and peer-related social
competence (Dunn et al., 1991; Dunn, 1995), although the
individual influence of child temperament on ToM has not
yet been studied. The relation between ToM performance and
emotion and temperament is thus surprisingly unclear, despite
the importance of both domains to social interactions (Cutting
and Dunn, 1999). Only recent studies have found some rela-
tions between a direct relation of gender and ToM mediated
by empathy (Ibanez et al., 2013). Here, we evaluated the rela-
tion between three personality traits as quantified by the CBQ
and ToM performance. None of these traits appears to have
an impact in the understanding of other’s minds. We should
point out, however, that given the lack of memory or general
intelligence measure, the use of non-standardized measures and
the ethnical homogeneity of our sample, among other factors,
interpretations of the present findings are to be made with
caution.
Finally, we introduced a novel way in which to quantify the
scaling property of the suite. This new proposal involves on one
hand an intuitive quantification through set inclusions, and, on
the other, a thorough comparison of a variety of logistic mod-
els including a varying amount of previous results as predictors
for the outcome of a certain task. Both methods provide strong
support for the scaling, and validate its use in the new age range
tested.
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